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SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY UPON
VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
OF CORPORATION
ADRIAN P. SCHOONE*
INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF DIscussION
The Wisconsin Business Corporation Law,' which revised, modern-
ized and codified the Wisconsin law on business corporations, became
generally effective as to all Wisconsin corporations with capital stock
on July 1, 1953. The Code was patterned after the Model Business
Corporation Act as drafted by the Committee on Corporate Laws of
the American Bar Association.2 One of the many objectives of the
draftsmen of the Code appears to be the limiting of liability of directors
and shareholders following voluntary dissolution of the corporation, 3
and the result of this objective is Section 180.787.4 Although almost
eight years have passed since enactment of this statute, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has not yet had opportunity to construe it. The
long-awaited revised Model Business Corporation Act Annotated has
recently been published 5 and contains a section8 substantially similar
to 180.787.7 The purpose of this article is to examine the statutes and
*B.S., LL.B., Marquette University; Associate, LaFrance, Thompson, Green-
quist, Evans & Dye, Racine, Wisconsin.
I Wis. STAT. ch. 180 (1959), hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Code."
2 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. V (1960). '
3 See Introduction to the Business Corporation Law, 22 Wis. STAT. ANN.
XXXV (1957).
4 WIS. STAT. §180.787 (1959): "Survival of remedy after dissohtion. The
dissolution of a corporation shall not take away or impair any remedy avail-
able to or against such corporation, its directors, or shareholders, for any
right or claim existing or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if
suit or other proceeding thereon is commenced within 2 years after the date
of such dissolution. Any such suit or proceeding by or against the corpora-
tion may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name.
The shareholders, directors and officers, shall have power to take such
corporate or other action as shall be appropriate to protect such remedy,
right or claim. If such corporation was dissolved by the expiration of its
period of duration, such corporation may amend its articles of incorporation
at any time during such period of 2 years so as to extend its period of
duration."
5 Published for American Bar Foundation by West Publishing Company (1960).
6 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §98 (1960).
7 The MODEL Act contains the following language after the words "The dis-
solution of a corporation" and before the words "shall not take away . . ":
"either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the Secretary
of State, or (2) by a decree of court when the court has not liquidated the
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cases in states having a similar law to determine the efficacy of 180.787
in purporting to abate remedies against shareholders of a dissolved
corporation after the expiration of the two year period following the
filing of articles of dissolution.8
COMMON LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
AND LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTIONS TO SHAREHOLDERS
In discussing the effect of liquidation and dissolution of a business
corporation on the liability (to its creditors) of shareholders receiving
assets of the dissolved corporation, it is well to briefly review terminol-
ogy. Dissolution, as in partnership law, means the termination of cor-
porate existence so that the corporation may no longer carry on its
business, since it lacks legal authority to do so. Liquidation is the pro-
cess of collecting assets, paying creditors, and distributing residual
assets, less liquidation expenses, to the shareholders in accordance with
their preferences.9
It was decided early in the course of the common law that a creditor
had no right to prevent the dissolution of a corporation even though
the legal authority to dissolve was granted after the debt was created.10
There was some dispute regarding the right of the creditor to pursue
the property in the hands of shareholders of the dissolved corporation.
Early treatises indicated that upon dissolution the corporate debts
ceased to exist, the corporate real property reverted to the grantors,
and the state was entitled to the personal property.11 However, the
validity of this was questioned at an early date.
It may be doubted whether it was ever the law that equitable
rights to property held by a corporation were lost by a dissolution
of the company. The doctrine that the property of a dissolved
corporation belongs to the King or to the original donors, was
first applied in the case of ecclesiastical and municipal corpora-
tions. In these cases there were no shareholders, and seldom
creditors; the property was in reality without an owner, after
the particular use for which it had been given had come to an
end by the dissolution of the corporation. But modern business
companies differ essentially from ecclesiastical and municipal
corporations, both in purpose and organization. The shareholders
or corporators in an ordinary business company are themselves
the donors of its property; each member contributes his share of
the capital for the common benefit of all; and the corporation it-
assets and business of the corporation as provided in this Act, or (3) by
expiration of its period of duration,..."
8 See Introduction to the Business Corporation Law, supra note 3, at XXXV.
9 See LATrIN, CORPORATIONS 550 (1959).
10 DoDD, AIMERICAN CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 142 (1954), citing Mumma v.
The Potomac Company. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 281 (1834).
21Cf. BLAcKSTONE 484-85 (1765) With 2 MORAIWTZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§1031, p. 988 (2d ed. 1886).
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self holds the property given it merely as trustee for its share-
holders.2
2
American courts traditionally drew an analogy to a deceased natural
person and his inability to hold property, sue or be sued, in consider-
ing the status of a creditor holding the obligations of a dissolved cor-
poration. Just as the representative of the estate of a deceased natural
person could sue and be sued on behalf of the deceased and hold his
property, the courts held that, in equity,13 the property of a dissolved
corporation passed to the shareholders subject to the payment of the
corporate debts and other liabilities.1 4 The United States Supreme
Court speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis expressed the law in Curran
v. State of Arkansas.
We are of opinion, that the dissolution of the Corporation,
under the Acts of Virginia and Maryland, cannot in any just
sense be considered, within the clause of the Constitution of the
United States on this subject, an impairing of the obligation of
the contracts of the Company by those States, any more than the
death of a private person can be said to impair the obligation of
his contracts. The obligation of those contracts survives; and
the creditors may enforce their claims against any property be-
longing to the Corporation, which has not passed into the hands
of bona fide purchasers, but is still held in trust for the Com-
pany, or for the stockholders thereof, at the time of its dissolu-
tion, in any mode permitted by the local laws.
Indeed, if it be once admitted that the property of an insolv-
ent trading corporation, while under the management of its
officers, is a trust fund in their hands for the benefit of creditors,
it follows that a court of equity, which never allows a trust to
fail for want of a trustee, would see to the execution of that
trust, although by the dissolution of the corporation, the legal
title to its property had been changed .... 2-
The theory that the assets of a corporation whose right to do busi-
ness had expired constituted a "trust fund" for the benefit of creditors
was the product of Mr. Justice Story's pen.16 It has sometimes been
criticized as a misleading label since it is not the same doctrine as ex-
pressed in early cases that stockholders of going corporations held
their capital stock in trust for creditors.' 7 Under proper application of
'12 MORAVETZ, supra note 11, at 1032; See also Lindemann v. Rusk, 125 Wis. 210,
230, 104 N.W. 119 (1905).
132 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §98, para. 4, p. 538 (1960).
'4 Mumma v. The Potomac Company, supra note 10; LATTIN, supra note 9, at
553; 19 C.J.S. Corporations §1760 (1940); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §318,
pp. 732-733 (1946); Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36
HARV. L. REv. 509, 545 (1923).
25 55 U.S, (15 How.) 304, 311 (1853).
16 See Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, 30 Fed. Cas. 435, No. 17,944 (C.C.D.
Me. 1824).
17 See Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36 HARv. L. REV.
509, 545 (1923).
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the common law, creditors of a dissolved corporation were permitted to
reach all assets of the corporation, and not simply a fraction of the
assets equal to the amount of its capital.' s Whatever trust there was
arose from the equitable rights of the stockholders in the corporate
property and their conditional liability to corporate creditors. It was
rather a trust in the administration of the assets after possession by a
court of equity than a trust attaching to the property, as such, for the
benefit of creditors.'
9
The importance of limiting the meaning of the dissolution-trust
fund theory stems from early Wisconsin cases ruling that the assets
of an insolvent corporation are not a trust fund for the benefit of cre-
ditors in such a sense that a creditor knowing of such insolvency can-
not acquire a valid lien by attaching the corporate property.' 0 As will
be seen as the discussion develops, Wisconsin is a leading jurisdiction
holding that, after the dissolution of a corporation, its property passes
to its stockholders subject to the payment of the corporation debts.2 1
The proper rationale for this early-established rule permitting
creditors to trace assets into the hands of transferee shareholders seems
grounded in constitutional principles. The United States Supreme
Court, per Mr. Justice Story, held in Mumna v. The Potomac Com-
pany22 that the obligation of a contract made by a corporation survived
after it had been dissolved, and state laws governing the dissolution
procedure could not effectively impair the obligation of the contract.3
Wisconsin hastily accepted the warning of the United States Supreme
Court.'
4
Because of constitutional prohibitions against severing the claims of
creditors, courts were charged with responsibility for supervising the
liquidating distributions. Since shareholders were not entitled to a
share of the assets of the corporation until corporate debts were paid,
if the assets were divided, leaving any debts unpaid, every shareholder
receiving his share was in equity liable pro rata to contribute to the
discharge of such debts out of the funds he had received.' 5 But this
21 Ibid.
19 Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371 (1893); Graham v. La-
Crosse & M. Railroad Company, 102 U.S. 148 (1880).
20 See Ballin v. Merchants' Exchange Bank, 89 Wis. 278, 61 N.W. 1118 (1895);
Ford v. Hill, 92 Wis. 188, 66 N.W. 115 (1896) ; Hinz v. Van Dusen, 95 Wis.
503, 70 N.W. 657 (1897) ; Marvin v. Anderson, 111 Wis. 387, 87 N.W. 226
(1901) ; Atlanta & Walworth Butter & Cheese Association, 141 Wis. 377,
123 N.W. 106 (1910). Cf. In re Sparta Canning Co., 73 F. 2d 732 (7th Cir.
1934).
2 See text at infra, note 32.
2 Supra note 10.
2 See Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684 (1899); Annot., 47
A.L.R. 1288, 1355 (1927).
24 Whiting v. The Sheboygan & Fond du Lac Railroad Company, 25 Wis. 167,
206-207 (1870).
25 16 FLET cHER, CYCLOPEDIA COaPORATIONS §8224 (Rev. Vol. 1942); Marshall v.
Fredericksburg Lumber Co., 162 Va. 136, 173 S.E. 553, 557 (1934).
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transferee liability was secondary and limited by the amount of the
liquidating dividend, not merely by the pro rata share of the corpora-
tion's obligations in the ratio which the transferee shareholder's stock
bore to the total outstanding stock at the time of the liquidation. And
the shareholder, although severally liable for the corporate debts, had a
right of contribution from other shareholders .
2
The availability of this equitable remedy was something of a "con-
solation award" for the creditor holding a claim against a corporation
that took the notion to dissolve. Upon dissolution and termination of
the legal existence of the corporation, no action could be maintained
against it.27 This was true whether the action was one in personam or
one in rem.2 The corporation could not carry on except for the pur-
pose of liquidating its assets, paying its creditors, and distributing what
remained to the shareholders. 29
This arrangement was soon recognized as unsatisfactory and sta-
tutes were enacted to preserve the life of the corporation during the
winding-up period, designating certain representatives to supervise the
process of liquidating.30 The statutory granting of extended life served
the double purpose of permitting the corporation to prosecute and de-
fend claims in its own right. This permission has generally been lim-
ited to a specified number of years.31 What the effect of the expiration
of the time period had on the creditor remedy under the common law
"trust fund" doctrine was the next question before the courts.
THE PRELUDE TO WIS. STAT. §180.787
The Wisconsin solution to the common law doctrine of abatement
of creditors' remedies against dissolved corporations was the enactment
of a statute that resuscitated the dissolved corporations to the extent
that the corporations "shall nevertheless continue ... for three years
thereafter for the purpose of prosecuting and defending actions, and
of enabling them to settle and close up their business, dispose of and
28 Comm. v. Switlik, 184 F. 2d 299 (3rd Cir. 1950) ; Phillips v. Comm., 283 U.S.
589, 603 (1931), citing: Benton v. American National Bank, 276 Fed. 368 (5th
Cir. 1921); McWilliams v. Excelsior Coal Co., 298 Fed. 884 (8th Cir. 1924);
U. S. v. Boss & P. Auto Co., 285 Fed. 410 (D. Ore. 1922), aff'd., 290 Fed. 167(9th Cir. 1923); Capps Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 15 F. 2d 528 (5th Cir. 1926);
Adams v. Perryman, 202 Ala. 469, 80 So. 853 (1919) ; Singer v. Hutchinson,
183 Ill. 606, 620, 56 N.E. 388 (1900); Kimbrough v. Davies, 104 Miss. 722,
61 So. 697 (1913) ; Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N.Y. 587 (1874).
27 Marion Phosphate Co. v. Perry, 74 Fed. 425 (5th Cir. 1896) ; Nelson v. Hub-
bard, 96 Ala. 238, 11 So. 428 (1892); National Pahquioque Bank v. First
Nat. Bank of Bethel, 36 Conn. 325 (1870) ; Venable Bros. v. Southern Granite
Co., 135 Ga. 508 (1910) ; Renick v. Bank of West Union, 13 Ohio 298 (1844) ;
Combs v. Keyes, 89 Wis. 297, 62 N.W. 89 (1895); Annot., 47 A.L.R. 1380
(1927) ; 97 A.L.R. 483 (1935).
28 13 Am. JTuR. Corporations §1354 (1938).
29 See Leibson v. Henry, 356 Mo. 953, 204 S.W. 2d 310, 315 (1947).
-30 Note, 23 Mo. L. REv. 82 (1958).
3113 Amf. JUR. Corporations §1363 (1938).
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convey their property and divide their assets and for no other pur-
pose ... ."32
In Lindemann v. Rusk 33 the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard an
argument to the effect that the enactment of the statute was intended
by the legislature to furnish an exclusive remedy for creditors and to
abrogate the common law equitable remedy previously available against
shareholders. The Court emphatically rejected this suggestion.
* * .The contention seems an unwarranted construction of
this statute, in view of the requirements for the protection of pri-
vate rights and interests in its assets. This section, in effect,
extends the life of a corporation for three years to accomplish
final liquidation of its affairs through its directors, and there is
nothing which suggests that the usual equitable remedies should
not be resorted to at the expiration of such period, if the direc-
tors fail to accomplish this object within that time. .... 34
When given another opportunity to construe the statute, the Court
was more explicit.
However, the debts of the corporation, if any, were not
extinguished because the corporation ceased to exist. The credi-
tors of the corporation may follow its assets into the hands of
the stockholders, who may be required to respond to the extent
of their distributive shares thereof. Lindemann v. Rusk, 125
Wis. 210, 229, 104 N.W. 119.35
And the Court thereafter continued their assertions that the creditor
had his remedy against the transferees of the dissolved corporation,
until the enactment of the new Code in 1953.36 Among the criticisms
directed at Chapter 181, the former Business Corporation chapter, was
a request for a revised dissolution statute dealing with the status of
contracts executory at the time the carrying on of regular business
ended. 37 While remedial legislation was suggested, it was also urged
that it was "unjust for a corporation by its own act to detract from
contractual benefits it has conferred for consideration received .... ,"38
CONSTRUCTION OF 180.787 AND ITS COUNTERPARTS-
LIMITING THE CAUSE OF ACTION RATHER THAN CORPORATE EXISTENCE
As discussed above, Section 181.02 of the old Code limited corpor-
ate existence to three years after dissolution. This provision thus had
32 WIS. STAT. §181.02 (1949).
33 125 Wis. 210, 104 N.W. 119 (1905).
4 Id. at 231, 104 N.W. at 125.3 State ex rel. Pabst v. Circuit Court, 184 Wis. 301, 307, 199 N.W. 213, 215
(1924).
36 West Milwaukee v. Bergstrom, 242 Wis. 137, 7 N.W. 2d 587 (1943). See also
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm.. 260 Wis. 298, 50 N.W. 2d
399 (1951).
37 Comment, 33 MARQ. L. REv. 114 (1949).
38 Id. at 118.
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the rather anamolous effect of reincarnating what was thought by defi-
nition to be dead-the dissolved corporation. The basis for the anomaly
was the conceived analogy between the death of an individual and the
dissolution of a corporation. But the legislative creation resulting from
this drawn resemblance did restrict the likeness to a three year period,
making no provision for claims presented thereafter. The Pabst case 39
and the subsequent decisions 40 following its rationale demonstrably
illustrated the inadequacy of the statutes. And commentators readily
suggested that the revival of the dead corporation approach be aban-
doned in favor of legislation deferring the death until the completion
of liquidation, so as to settle corporate rights and liabilities prior to
demise.41
The result of the suggestions and criticisms is the "two-step" pro-
cedure for voluntary dissolution contained in Chapter 180. Upon reach-
ing a decision to dissolve,42 the corporation "publicizes" it by filing and
recording a statement of intent to dissolve with the Secretary of State
and Register of Deeds of the appropriate county.43 Thereupon the
corporation is no longer authorized to carry on business, except that
necessary for the proper winding up of its affairs.44 No specific time
limit has been placed upon the period of winding up, and when provi-
sion has been made for the payment of all debts and all property has
been distributed, articles of dissolution are filed and recorded, "and
thereupon the existence of the corporation shall cease, except for the
purpose of suits, other proceedings and appropriate corporate action
of shareholders, directors and officers as provided in this chapter.... "'
The filing and recording of both the statement of intent to dissolve
and articles of dissolution has been rather appropriately termed a "two-
step dissolution" by the draftsmen of the Model Business Corporation
Act.46 Alaska,47 California,48 Colorado,49 Illinois,50 Iowa,51 Kentucky,"2
Louisiana, 53 Minnesota,- North Carolina,55 Oklahoma,
56 0 r e g o n, '57
39 Supra note 35.
40 Supra note 36.
41 See Comment, 33 MARQ. L. REV. 114 (1949).
42 See WIs. STAT. §180.753 (1959).
43 WIS. STAT. §180.755 (1959).
44 Ibid.
45 Wis. STAT. §180.767 (1959).
46 See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§85, 86, para. 2.02(1) (1960).4 7 ALASKA COMp. LAWS ANN. §§36-2A-114 to 36-2A-116, 36-2A-121, 36-2A-122
(1958 Supp.).
48 CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§4602 to 4604, 4605, 4607 to 4617, 4619, 5000 to 5008,
5200 to 5201.5.
49 COLO. CORP. ACT §§80 to 82, 87, 88, COLO. LAWS, S.B. 14.
50 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§157.77-157.79, 157.80, 157.81.
51 I0WA CODE ANN. §§496A.2-496A.84, 496A.89, 496A.90.
52 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§271.505-271.515, 271.535-271.545.5 3 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§12:53-12:54, 12:57-12:62.
54 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§301.46-301.48, 301.51-301.56.
55 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§55-4, 55-114 to 55-119, 55-121.
1961]
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Pennsylvania,58 Texas,59 Virginia,60 Washington,6 and the District of
Columbia 62 all have provisions substantially similar to Wisconsin.
Among those states providing for dissolution immediately on filing with
or acceptance by the secretary of state of a form stating that the pre-
requisites for voluntary dissolution have been met63 are Alabama, 64
Arizona,6 5 Arkansas,6 6 Connecticut,67 Indiana,6 s Maryland,6 9 Mich-
igan 7 0 Nebraska,7 1 Nevada 7 2 New Jersey 7 3 Ohio,7 4 South Carolina,7 5
Tennessee7 6 and West Virginia.7 7
Under the "two-step" liquidation procedure, there is no necessity to
continue the existence of a corporation following its dissolution for the
purpose of settling its affairs. Under Section 180.787 and its counter-
part in the Model Business Corporation Act,78 it is provided that, while
the dissolution of a corporation shall not destroy any remedy available
either to or against the corporation, suit must be commenced within
two years after the date of dissolution.7 9 The intention of the drafts-
men apparently was to place the limitation, not on the corporation's
existence, but on the cause of action.80 The hoped-for result was the
abating of causes of action against shareholders after the expiration of
two years from the date of filing of articles of dissolution. s ' Some of
56 OKLA. STAT. TIT. 18, §§1.178 to 1.185, 1.186, 1.189 to 1.192, 1.194, 1.219,
1.220, 1223, 1225, 1.226.
57 ORE. REV. STAT. §§57.526, 57.541-57.551, 57.575, 57.580.
58 PA.. STAT. ANN. TIT. 15, §§2852-1101, 2852-1103, 2852-1104, 2852-1105.
59 VERNON'S TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT, ART. 6.04 to 6.06, 6.11, 6.12.
60 VA. CODE ANN. §§13.1-79, 13.1-82 to 13.1-84, 13.1-89, 13.1-90.
61 WASH. REV. CODE §§23.01.530, 23.01.560, 23.01.570 to 23.01.620, 23.01.630.
62 D.C. CODE ANN. §§29-930c to 29-930e, 29-930j, 29-930k.
63 I.e., the "one-step" procedure. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§85, 86, para.
2.02(2) (1960).6 4 ALA. Bus. CORP. AcT §§76, 77, ALA. LAWS 1959, ACT 414.
65 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§10-362, 10-367.
6 6
ARK. STAT. ANN. §64-805.
67 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§33-285, 22-376 (Effective January 1, 1961).
68 IND. ANN. STAT. §25-241 (b) (4).
69 MD. ANN. CODE, ART. 23, §§76(b), 77(c), 77.
70 MICH. Comip. LAWS §§450.71 and 450.72 (1948), 450.73, 450.74 (Supp. 1956).
' NEE. REV. STAT. §§21-183 to 21-185 (1954).
72 NEV. REV. STAT. §§78.580(2), 78.620.
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§14:13-1, 14:13-2.
74 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§1701.86(F) to 1701.86(I).
75 S.C. CODE §§12-642, 12-643.7 6 TENN. CODE ANN. §§48-513 to 48-515.
77 W. VA. CODE ANN. §3092.
782 MODEL Bus. COR. AcT ANN. §98 (1960).
79Other states having substantially similar provisions are Alaska-ALASKA
Cosip. LAWS ANN. §36-2A-134 (1958 Supp.); Colorado-CoLo. CORP. ACT§100, COLO. LAWS (1958), S.B. 14, as amended, COLO. LAWS (1959), S.B. 216;
Illinois-ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §157.94; Iowa-IOWA CODE ANN. §496A.
192; Kentucky-Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §271.585; North Dakota-N.D. REv.
CODE §10-2124 (1957 Supp.); and District of Columbia-D.C. CODE ANN.
§29-931.
80 See Young, Some Comments on the New Wisconsin Business Corporation
Law, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 5, 15.
81 See Introduction to the Business Corporation Law, 22 Wis. STAT. ANN.
XXXV (1957).
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the draftsmen carefully avoided a prediction as to the proximity of
their creation to the desired result.s2 To make such determination at
the present time requires an examination of the cases in other jurisdic-
tions since the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not construed the statute
since its passage.
The neighboring state of Illinois has been most active in litigating
questions arising under its counterpart 3 of 180.787. The vital ruling
handed down by the Illinois courts is that the statute limits capacity to
sue or be sued to two years, in contradistinction to the typical statute
of limitation bearing only upon remedy and not right. The first case so
holding was decided by an Illinois Court of Appeals. In Dukes v. Har-
rison & Reidy,s4 suit was brought against a dissolved corporation and
its shareholders, on the allegation that the latter had not paid the full
subscription price of their shares. The suit was based on a section of
the Illinois corporation statutes providing that after the dissolution of
a corporation, any creditor could bring suit in equity against all persons
in any way responsible for the dissolution, "by joining the corporation
in such suit. After exhausting the assets of such corporation, each
stockholder may be required to pay his pro rata share of such debts
and liabilities to the extent of the unpaid portion of the stock. ... s
The defendant representatives of the corporation made a special ap-
pearance and objected to the jurisdiction of the court based on the
fact that under the forerunner to the present statute,86 the time for suit
had expired.
The plaintiff argued in rebuttal that because he had previously
brought a suit of the same nature, following which the two year period
expired prior to the present action, he could rely on Illinois law provid-
ing that where the statute of limitation expires prior to the time the
action is dismissed, a plaintiff may have another year within which to
reinstitute his action. The defendant corporation replied that the two
year period for bringing suit under the corporation statutes was not a
period of limitation, but rather a definite limit on corporate capacity
to sue and be sued. The Illinois appellate court accepted the construc-
tion of the statute submitted by the defense.8 7 And the Illinois courts
have persisted in this construction. 8
82 Contrast Young, supra note 80, with Luce, The Wisconsin Business Corpora-
tion Law, 36 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 23 (1952): "... Remedies against the corpora-
tion, directors, and shareholders are preserved for a period of two years
after articles of dissolution are filed." Quaere as to the extent of shareholder
liability thereafter.
83 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 32, §157.94.
84270 Ill. App. 372 (1933).
85 CAHILL'S REV. ILL. STAT., ch. 32, para. 53.
86 Supra note 83.
87The Appellate Court relied on Bishop v. Chicago Ry. Co., 303 Ill., 273, 135 N.E.
439 (1922), which did not deal with a question of corporation law.
88 See Sarelis v. McCue & Co., 291 Ill. App. 540 (1937); Ruthfield v. Louis-
1961]
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The effect of the Dukes case was to negate an earlier decision of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which held that where the informa-
tional data filed with the Secretary of State contained a positive mis-
statement of fact as to tax liabilities, the federal government was not
barred from collecting its claim. 9 The Court of Appeals seemed to
admit as much in Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Teter,90 where
suit was brought against a dissolved corporation and its stockholders to
recover upon certain guaranties. Motions to dismiss the complaint, and
to quash the summons and the return thereof against the dissolved
corporation were sustained by the trial court. The plaintiff argued on
appeal that although the defendant company was dissolved more than
two years prior to the filing of the action, it yet had an equitable rem-
edy against the shareholders, since "in equity the assets of a dissolved
corporation passing to its stockholders constitute a trust fund which
can be reached in their hands by the corporation's creditors for the
purpose of satisfying claims .... -91 The Court of Appeals rejected the
argument as it interpreted the two-year limit statute as controlling both
the substantive and procedural rights of the parties, to the exclusion of
any common law equitable remedy.92
But the court went on to weaken this ruling by alternatively decid-
ing that since the defendant stockholders were sued as representatives
of all the stockholders of the dissolved corporation, and the plaintiff
had failed to plead impracticability as justification for his omission of
the others, the complaint was procedurally deficient.93
Thus, the Teter case does not wholly support any notion that the
two-year statute will bar a common-law remedy against shareholders
after the expiration of such period. Other dictum came as close. In
Markus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,9 4 the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that
ville Fuel Co., 312 Ill. App. 415, 38 N.W. 2d 832 (1942); Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 102 (1937); McNeill v. Savin,
244 Wis. 552, 13 N.W. 2d 82 (1944); Gordon v. Loew's Incorporated, 147
F. Supp. 398 (D.NJ. 1956).
89In re Wolf Mfg. Industries, 56 F. 2d 64, 66 (7th Cir. 1932) "... there
having been no compliance with the statute by the corporation, and the
dissolution being void as to the government, the two-year limitation provided
for actions against a dissolved corporation where dissolution is perfected
does not apply." The case was cited approvingly in Missouri State Life Ins.
Co. v. Langreder, 87 F. 2d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 1937) : ". . . A suit against a
corporation does not abate if there is a local policy expressed by statute
or decision, that the corporation, although dissolved, shall continue for a
given period for the purpose of winding up its affairs ......
90 117 F. 2d 716 (7th Cir. 1941).
91 Id. at 726.
92 Id. at 727.
93 Id. at 727-28.
94373 Ill. 577, 27 N.E. 2d 463, 128 A.L.R. 567 (1940). See also O'Neill v. Con-
tinental Illinois Co., 341 Ill. App. 119, 93 N.E. 2d 160 (1950).
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The dissolution of the corporation in this case, therefore, did
not have the effect of destroying the mortgage lien against the
premises though it did bar, after two years, any action against
the corporation itself. ... It follows that the limitation provided
in section 94 of the Corporations act, III. Rev. Stat. 1939, chap.
32, par. 157.94, limiting suits against the corporation, its officers
or stockholders, to a period of two years after dissolution, is not
applicable here, though it barred any remedy against the corpora-
tion, its officers or stockholders .... 1
The most recent important case dealing with the meaning of Section
94 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act was decided in 1956.11
Stockholders of a dissolved Kentucky corporation brought suit on a
deficiency judgment entered in favor of the corporation prior to dissol-
ution. The defendant, a resident of Illinois, relied on a Kentucky sta-
tute97 which was almost identical to Section 94, since the dissolution
had occurred long before the suit was brought. The Court of Appeals
did not clearly specify whether Illinois or Kentucky corporate law ap-
plied, but did state the conflicts question was "perhaps not material."9' 8
At any rate, it did apply the limitations law of Illinois, and made short
shrift of the defense of want of capacity to sue because of expiration
of the two-year period.
As noted, Imperial filed its Certificate of Dissolution No-
vember 28, 1942, and it appears plain that under the provisionjust quoted any action for or against it was limited to a two-year
period. On expiration of that period it became extinct for all
purposes and it no longer had the capacity to sue or be sued.
We are unable to agree, however,... that this provision had a
like effect or any effect upon the rights of plaintiffs as former
shareholders of Imperial. The provision by its express language
applies to "any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred
prior to such dissolution." It is obvious that the right or claim of
Imperial in the Chicago judgment against defendant existed
prior to the time of its dissolution, but it is equally obvious that
the right or claim of plaintiffs in suit was not in existence prior
to that time.19
Applying the converse of the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, one
can argue that the effect of Levy is to render Section 94 and similar
statutes ineffective to bar creditor claims against shareholders. The
statutes speak of barring liabilities, along with rights, "incurred prior
to ... dissolution." If the derivative liability of a shareholder receiving
assets of a corporation does not arise until dissolution, 10° since prior to
95 Id. at 562, 27 N.E. 2d at 465.96 Levy v. Liebling, 238 F. 2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956).
97 Ky. RF-V. STAT. §271.585.98 Supra note 96, at 506.
99 Id. at 506-7.
100 See 13 Am. JUR. Corporations §1352, pp. 1197-98 (1938): "... after the
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that time the primary liability of the corporation can be enforced, the
two-year statute may be ineffectual to limit shareholder liability since
it did not arise "prior to dissolution"!
To defeat such construction, one might argue that the words "prior
to such dissolution" refer to any point in time before the date the arti-
cles of dissolution are filed and recorded. Since the shareholders would
of necessity receive assets prior to that date because of the recital in
the certificate,10 1 and any ignored creditor would as a practical matter
be frustrated in suing the "shell" corporation thereafter, a court might
so construe the statute.102 Section 180.787 itself speaks of suing "with-
in 2 years after the date of such dissolution."'10 And the legislative
history indicates quite clearly that that date does not occur until all
corporation-ending business is completed. 10 3 Indeed, the Levy case may
be restricted to its facts and shareholders may be able to rest without
disturbance from that case.
But this does not resolve the broader issue of the effect of 180.787
on the transferee liability of shareholders without regard to the exact
point in time at which the liability arises. The Teter case came close
to holding the statute efficacious in abolishing the common law remedy
predicated on the "trust fund" theory.' 0 4 But no case has been located
which squarely decides the question. An early North Carolina case
did hold that a counterpart of old Wis. Stat. §181.02 had the effect of
abolishing all common law remedies. In Von Glahn. v. De Rosset,10 5 an
action was brought against shareholders of a dissolved bank by virtue
of a personal liability clause in the charter of the bank providing that in
the event of insolvency or inability of the bank to pay, the shareholders
would be liable to creditors in an amount double the value of the stock
held by them. The shareholders relied on a limitation statute preventing
corporate liability from abating for three years after dissolution, since
the period had expired prior to the action. The plaintiff countered with
the argument that an equitable remedy was effective irrespective of sta-
tute. The Supreme Court of North Carolina carefully discussed the
dissolution of a corporation, its property passes to its stockholders subject to
the payment of the corporate debts." [Emphasis supplied.]
101 See Wis. STAT. §180.765 (4) (1959).
102 But in Bank of Alameda County v. McColgan, 69 Cal. App. 2d 464, 159 P. 2d
31 (1945), the court held that the effective date of dissolution for franchise
tax purposes in California, a jurisdiction with a "two-step" dissolution pro-
cedure, is when the state is notified of intent to dissolve and not when the
final certificate of dissolution is issued.
102a [Emphasis supplied.]
103 See Revision Committee Note, 1951: "... under the new chapter, in voluntary
dissolution, articles of dissolution are not filed and the corporation is not dis-
solved until after the winding up process has been completed. See 180.755,
180.757 and 180.765.... " 23 Wis. STAT. ANN. 252 (1957).
104 Supra note 90.
105 81 N.C. 467 (1879).
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validity of the "trust fund" doctrine, but ruled it was no longer avail-
able.
As the law-making power has thus undertaken to regulate
the settlement of the affairs of an expired corporation and pro-
vide the mode in which it shall be done, the statutory remedy
must be considered as superseding and substituted for all others
directed to the same end. The relief is within reach of each and
every creditor, and of the stockholders and members of the cor-
poration, during the space of three years, next ensuing the dis-
solution and no longer. The limitation is reasonable and proper
in itself and an inseparable condition of the remedy.108
Shareholders who would be quick to seize upon this case as a pana-
cea for the problem are reminded that many cases in addition to those
of Wisconsin'0 7 construing similar "one-step" dissolution statutes are
contra. 0 8
NOTICE TO CREDITORs-A MINImUM NECESSITY
FOR EFFECTIVENESS OF 180.787
Clearly, the efficacy of statutes molded in the pattern of the Model
Business Corporation Act'0 9 is unclear. But merely because the adju-
dicated cases indicate that a shareholder may not be free from the long
arm of the corporate creditor after the expiration of the statutory
period, there is not necessarily cause for legislative upheaval of the
statutes. There may be a serious question of fundamental policy as to
whether a shareholder receiving a liquidating distribution is entitled
to legislative protection to the detriment of the creditor."0 However,
the present confused state of the law is not a happy one. The drafts-
men of 180.787 approached their task with the avowed purpose"' of
limiting shareholder liability to two years after dissolution. The legis-
lative enactment of their labors is the recognition of policy favoring a
limitation of shareholder liability. How to bolster the legislation to make
it efficacious before courts is the present problem.
'Or Id. at 476. See also Heggie v. Building & Loan Association, 107 N.C. 581, 12
S.E. 277 (1890); Sisk v. Old Hickory Motor Freight, Inc., 222 N.C. 631, 24
S.E. 2d 489 (1945).
107 See footnotes 35 and 36 supra.
10 See, e.g., Miller, The Status of Choses in Action of Dissolved but Un-
administered Corporations After Expiration of the Statutory Period for
Winding Up, 9 Miss. L. J. 455, 476 (1937); Harned v. Beacon Hill Real
Estate Co., 9 Del. Ch. 411, 84 Atl. 229 (1912); Slaughter v. Moore, 82 Atl.
963 (Del. Ch. 1912) ; Addy v. Short, 81 A. 2d 300 (Del. Sup. 1951), 47 Del.
157, 89 A. 2d 136 (1952); Kratky v. Andrews, 224 Minn. 386, 28 N.W. 2d
624 (1947) ; Stensvad v. Ottman, 123 Mont. 158, 208 P. 2d 507 (1947) ; Elk
River Mill & Lumber Co. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 164 Cal. App. 159, 330
P. 2d 404 (1958) ; Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Dunscomb, 108
Tenn. 724, 69 S.W. 345 (1902) ; Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Apex Oil
Corp., 244 S.W. 2d 176 (Tenn. App. 1951).
109 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §98 (1960).
o10 See Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36 HARv. L. Rxv.
509 (1923).
"11 See footnotes 80-82 supra.
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Without an effective statute, transferee shareholders will be rele-
gated to limitation defenses predicated upon the normal six year statute
of limitation.11 2 The special limitation statute113 governing actions
against "stockholders ... to enforce a liability created by law . . ."
should be inapplicable to a creditor's action predicated upon the "trust
fund" theory evolved through the course of the common law. Section
330.51 has been construed as affecting only statutory liability and not
obligations grounded in the common law." 4
Even though Section 330.19 be applicable to the case the cause of
action may be interpreted as not "accruing" '11 5 until the dissolution of
the corporation, 116 and the statute would thus begin to toll from that
period.117 Of course the primary liability of the corporation must still
be outstanding at the time of the dissolution.""
The discussion of what statute of limitation will apply may well be
academic in the event the tax collector unexpectedly extends his talons
in the direction of the transferee shareholder. It is fundamental that
governments are usually bound only by their self-imposed limitation of
time. In point of fact, the transferee liability for taxes imposed on
shareholders of dissolved corporations" 9 may well be the policy justifi-
cation for the creation of statutes nobly attempting to solve the prob-
lems resulting from that liability in terms of defining it, rather than
barring it after lapse of time.
The threat of unexpected suit against the transferee shareholder
does seem grave enough to warrant legislative attention. There is no
doubt but that statutory provisions for dissolution of corporations do
not violate constitutional prohibitions against the impairment of con-
tracts.1 20 It might be argued that the very basis for sustaining the con-
112 WIS. STAT. §330.19(3) (1959).
113 Wis. STAT. §330.51 (1959).
114 Gores v. Field, 109 Wis. 408, 84 N.W. 867, 85 N.W. 411 (1901); Musback
v. Schaefer, 115 Wis. 357, 91 N.W. 966 (1902) ; Bank of Verona v. Stewart,
223 Wis. 577, 270 N.W. 534 (1937). Cf. G.M.C. Hotels, Inc. v. Hanson, 234
Wis. 164, 290 N.W. 615 (1940). An astute lawyer might argue that Wis.
STAT. §180.40(5) (b) (1959) is the basis for any creditor's action against a
transferee shareholder, especially in view of Wis. STAT. §180.765(3) (1959)
(recital that all debts of which the corporation has knowledge have been
provided for). The importance of utilizing 330.51 is because the limitation
period does not begin to toll until discovery of the facts creating the share-
holder liability.
115 WIS. STAT. §330.14 (1959).
116 See 19 C.J.S. Corporations §1762 (1940).
117 Abercrombie v. United Light & Power Co., 7 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1934).
11s Ibid.
119 Such shareholders often are charged with notice of a subsequently levied
tax constituting a potential tax liability at the time of dissolution. See 9
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §53.15; Scott v. Comm., 117
F. 2d 36 (8th Cir. 1941); United States v. Armstrong, 26 F. 2d 227 (8th
Cir. 1928) ; Updike v. United States, 8 F. 2d 913 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied,
271 U.S. 661 (1926); United States v. Seyler, 142 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Pa.
1956).
120 Mumma v. The Potomac Company, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 281 (1834) ; Crossman
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stitutionality of dissolution statutes is the remedy surviving against the
shareholders. But it should be within legislative province to limit that
remedy to a certain period, since the setting of a time limit in a statute
of limitation appears to be a matter of legislative discretion.1 21 Dis-
counting the effect of Illinois construction1 22 of such legislation as not
properly a statute of limitation, but rather a limitation on capacity to
sue or be sued, the legislature seems empowered to limit the liability
if it so sees fit and takes proper action to do so.1 23 However, any
change to limit liability should probably be made prospective in effect
to withstand judicial scrutiny. 24
Irrespective of the desirability of change in the language of
180.787, the Wisconsin legislature may wish to consider the enactment
of legislation providing for mailing to creditors a notice of intention
to dissolve by the dissolving corporation.
The Model Act contains such a provision12 5 as do many states.
1 2
1
Affording notice to all known creditors should enhance the validity of
the legislative attempt to limit time for presenting creditor claims.1 27
Decisions have been found in which courts were unimpressed with the
fact such notice was given.128 But providing for notice and clearly ex-
pressing an intention of making the statute the exclusive remedy-de-
fining shareholder liability in terms of the statute-could go a long way
in effectuating the purpose of 180.787 and its counterparts.
v. Vivienda Water Co., 150 Cal. 575, 89 Pac. 335 (1907) ; Nelson v. Hubbard,
96 Ala. 238, 11 So. 428 (1892); In re Courtney Bros., Inc., 110 Mont. 289,
100 P. 2d 471 (1942).
121 Nadstanek v. Trask, 130 Ore. 669, 281 Pac. 840 (1929).
:122 Dukes v. Harrison & Reidy, 270 Il. App. 372 (1933), discussed above.
12-3 See Miller, The Status of Choses in Action of Dissolved but Unadininistered
Corporations After Expiration of the Statutory Period for Winding Up, 9
Miss. L. J. 455 (1937).
124 See Casey v. Trecker, 268 Wis. 87, 66 N.W. 2d 724 (1954); Guardianship
of Blenski, 226 Wis. 361, 276 N.W. 626 (1937); Gianella v. Bigelow, 96 Wis.
185, 71 N.W. 111 (1897) ; Hasbrouck v. Shipman, 16 Wis. 296 (1862).
-5 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT ANN. §80(a) (1960).
126 Id. at 446. See, e.g., WEST'S ANN. CAL. CoR'. CODE §4605 as amended by L.
1957, ch. 2261, §34; N.C. GEN. STAT., 1957 Cum. Supp. §55-119.
12 7 LATTIN, CORORATIONS 569 (1959).
18 Bates v. Miss. Ind. Gas Co., 173 Miss. 361, 161 So. 133 (1935); 19 C.J.S.
Corporations §1760 (1940).
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